The Court of Appeal dismissed Dan Hartman’s appeal

April 16, 2026, In Hartman v. Canada (Attorney General), 2026 ONCA 270, the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld a lower court ruling dismissing a lawsuit against Health Canada brought by Daniel Hartman.  The court concluded that agencies responsible for public health policy do not owe a private duty of care to individual citizens in the exercise of their statutory functions. The decision reinforces longstanding legal principles limiting government liability in matters of public regulation and policy-making.

This appeal arises from the tragic death of the appellant’s son, 17-year-old Sean Hartman, who passed away on September 27, 2021, 33 days after receiving a Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine (the “Vaccine”). The appellant commenced an action under s. 61(1) of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 against the respondents for negligence and misfeasance in public office (the “Claim”).[^1] The Claim alleged that the respondents were negligent, recklessly indifferent, and/or willfully blind in their approval, monitoring, and promotion of the Vaccine, and that Sean Heartman’s death was a foreseeable and proximate result of the respondents’ conduct.

The motion judge held that the claim in negligence was bound to fail because the statutory scheme established only general duties to the public, there were no specific interactions alleged between the respondents and Sean Hartman, and the respondents’ actions in approving and promoting the Vaccine were an expression of core policy decisions taken in order to protect the Canadian public as a whole. The motion judge further concluded that even if she had found a prima facie basis for recognizing a private law duty of care, there were residual policy concerns that would negate the existence of such a duty. In particular, the imposition of a private law duty of care in these circumstances would create a chilling effect on government decision-makers who were responsible for protecting the general Canadian public during a pandemic.

The statutory scheme applicable in this case establishes duties that are owed to the general public rather than to particular individuals or groups. In particular, s. 4(1) of the Department of Health Act, S.C. 1996, c. 8, defines the powers, duties, and functions of the Minister as extending to all matters within federal jurisdiction “relating to the promotion and preservation of the health of the people of Canada”. This includes the promotion and preservation of “the physical, mental and social well-being of the people of Canada”; the protection of “the people of Canada against risks to health and the spreading of diseases”; and “investigation and research into public health, including the monitoring of diseases” (s. 4(2)).

The motion judge’s finding that the statutory scheme establishes duties owed to the general public rather than to particular individuals or groups is consistent with a growing body of jurisprudence which has declined to impose private law duties of care in the context of government policy decisions which are made in response to health emergencies impacting the general population.

Endorsing the approach taken in Eliopoulos, the court in Williams held that the public health statutory scheme in Ontario could not ground a duty of care given its focus on the public at large, rather than specific individuals. In furtherance of the general public interest, public officials must “balance ‘a myriad of competing interests’, the nature of which are inconsistent with the imposition of a private law duty of care”: Williams, at para. 25 (emphasis added).

The motion judge was similarly correct in her finding that, even if a prima facie duty of care might have been found to exist, residual policy considerations warranted negating any such duty. As discussed above, not only was it inevitable that some members of the public would be adversely affected no matter what the Minister decided, it was impossible to predict in advance the extent or severity of these adverse impacts. As such, this was a classic case where subjecting government actions to liability in tort carried with it the potential for indeterminate liability to an unlimited class. Both this court as well as the Supreme Court of Canada have emphasized that such unlimited liability weighs against recognizing a novel duty of care: Cooper, at para. 54; Attis, at para. 74; and Eliopoulos, at para. 32. Relatedly, imposing private law duties toward individuals would impair the ability of government decision-makers to make difficult but necessary decisions that advance the general public interest, out of a fear that in so doing they might incur civil liability in relation to persons who might be adversely affected: Attis, at para. 75; Eliopoulos, at para. 33. We agree with the motion judge that recognizing a duty of care toward individual Canadians who may receive a vaccine in the circumstances of a global pandemic would unduly constrain the ability of public health officials to appropriately respond with measures that protect the health of Canadians as a whole.

Therefore they conclude that the motion judge did not err in finding that it was plain and obvious that the respondents did not owe a private law duty of care to the appellant’s son and, accordingly, the cause of action in negligence was bound to fail.

A key governing principle in establishing liability for misfeasance in public office is that the defendant was subjectively aware, reckless, or wilfully blind to the fact that their conduct was unlawful and would likely harm the plaintiff. The motion judge correctly identified this as the key shortcoming in the appellant’s pleading of this cause of action. The Claim baldly alleged that the respondents were reckless or wilfully blind to the fact that (1) their conduct in approving, overseeing, and promoting the Vaccine was unlawful and (2) their unlawful conduct was likely to injure Sean Hartman. Neither assertion can be supported by the facts pleaded. We will review the essential elements of the tort, and then each of the two bald assertions in turn.

In legal principles court explained that, in order to make out a claim for misfeasance in public office, the plaintiff must establish two elements: (1) a public officer was engaged in deliberate and unlawful conduct in their capacity as a public officer; and (2) the public officer was aware both that their conduct was unlawful and that it was likely to harm the plaintiff: Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263, at para. 23.

Significantly, the tort of misfeasance in public office requires an element of bad faith. Thus, the mere fact that the public officer is aware that a decision may cause harm to certain individuals does not, in itself, give rise to a claim of misfeasance since “[i]n a democracy, public officers must retain the authority to make decisions that, where appropriate, are adverse to the interests of certain citizens”: Odhavji Estate, at para. 28. A claim for misfeasance can only arise where an officer “blatantly disregards his or her official duty … [and] demonstrates a conscious disregard for the interests of those who will be affected by the misconduct in question” Odhavji Estate, at para. 29. The alleged misconduct by the public officer must be deliberate and unlawful, with some awareness of harm to the plaintiff as an individual: Odhavji Estate, at paras. 24-25, 29.

Furthermore, the respondents’ Impugned Statements that the Vaccine was highly effective in combatting COVID-19 were based not only on the fact that it appeared to significantly reduce incidence of the disease, but also that it dramatically lessened the severity of the disease in those who were vaccinated and nevertheless contracted it. Study 2 showed that participants who received the placebo were 30 times more likely to develop severe COVID-19 as compared with those who received the Vaccine. It was the combined impact of a reduction in both the incidence and severity of the disease which led to the respondents’ concluding that the Vaccine was highly effective. Therefore, even accepting the appellant’s pleaded facts as true, he has not pleaded any material facts to support the assertion that the Vaccine was “minimally effective”. Without pleading minimal efficacy, the appellant cannot possibly establish the necessary element that the respondents were engaged in deliberate and unlawful conduct, much less that they were aware their conduct was unlawful and exhibited either bad faith or dishonesty.

The respondents relied on evidence and data from the World Health Organization, the Government of Canada, and Pfizer-BioNTech dating back to 2021.

https://www.minicounsel.ca/oca/2026/270

According to the court’s reasoning, government officials in Canada are shielded from personal liability for decisions made under their authority, even when those decisions allegedly cause harm to individuals. So, in the name of protecting the public, the state can impose sweeping mandates while those affected have little recourse through private lawsuits. The ruling reflects a legal principle that governments owe duties to the public collectively rather than to individual citizens personally.

What does it mean? In any future pandemic or emergency, if you do not comply with public orders, you could be seen as a threat and, in the name of the public good, be eliminated without any consequences. No matter how false or corrupt the organizations providing the evidence may be.

And that is what we should truly be worried about, especially when the government is trying to disarm the people while militarizing itself.

DB