Open letter from Jeffrey Sachs: „Learn history, Chancellor!

Dear Chancellor Merz,

You have repeatedly spoken of Germany’s responsibility for European security. This responsibility cannot be replaced by slogans, selective memory or the normalization of war rhetoric. Security guarantees are not one-way streets. They work both ways. This is neither a Russian nor an American argument; it is a fundamental principle of European security, explicitly enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act, the OSCE framework, and decades of post-war diplomacy.

Germany is obliged to face this moment with historical seriousness and honesty. In this respect, your recent rhetoric falls dangerously short of expectations.

Since 1990, Russia’s key security concerns have been repeatedly ignored, watered down, or directly violated – often with Germany’s active participation or acquiescence. This history must not be erased if the war in Ukraine is to end, and it must not be ignored if Europe wants to avoid a permanent state of confrontation.

At the end of the Cold War, Germany repeatedly and unequivocally gave the Soviet and later Russian leadership assurances that NATO would not expand eastward. These assurances were made in the context of German reunification. Germany benefited enormously from this. The rapid reunification of Germany –within NATO– would not have been possible without Soviet approval based on these commitments. To later pretend that these assurances were meaningless or merely casual remarks is not realistic, but historical revisionist.

In 1999, Germany participated in the NATO bombing of Serbia, the first major war NATO fought without a UN Security Council mandate. This was not a defensive action, but a landmark intervention that fundamentally changed the post-Cold War security order. For Russia, Serbia was not an abstract matter. The message was unmistakable: NATO would use force beyond its territory, without a UN mandate and without regard for Russian objections.

In 2002, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the ABM Treaty, a cornerstone of strategic stability over three decades. Germany raised no serious objections. But the erosion of the arms control architecture did not occur in a vacuum. Missile defense systems deployed closer to Russia’s borders were rightly perceived by Russia as destabilizing. Dismissing these perceptions as paranoia was political propaganda and by no means wise diplomacy.

In 2008, Germany recognized Kosovo’s independence, despite explicit warnings that this would undermine the principle of territorial integrity and set a precedent with far-reaching consequences. Once again, Russia’s objections were dismissed as malicious, and the fundamental concerns were not taken seriously.

The constant push for NATO expansion to include Ukraine and Georgia – formally declared at the 2008 Bucharest summit – crossed the clearest red lines, despite years of loud, clear, consistent and repeated objections from Moscow. When a major power identifies a key security interest and emphasizes it repeatedly over decades, ignoring it is not diplomacy, but a deliberate escalation.

Germany’s role in Ukraine since 2014 is particularly worrying. Berlin, together with Paris and Warsaw, brokered the agreement of February 21, 2014, between President Yanukovych and the opposition – an agreement that was intended to end the violence and preserve the constitutional order. Within a few hours, this agreement failed. A violent coup followed. A new government was created through unconstitutional means. Germany immediately recognized and supported the new regime. The agreement guaranteed by Germany was abandoned without consequences.

The Minsk Agreement II of 2015 was intended to represent the correction – a negotiated framework to end the war in eastern Ukraine. Germany once again acted as guarantor power. But for seven years, the Minsk Agreement II was not implemented by Ukraine. Kyiv openly rejected its political provisions. Germany did not enforce them. Former German and other European leaders have since acknowledged that Minsk was treated less as a peace plan than as a defensive measure. This admission alone requires an examination of the events.

Against this background, calls for ever more weapons, ever sharper rhetoric and ever greater „determination“ ring hollow. They call on Europe to forget the recent past in order to justify a future of permanent confrontation.

Enough of the propaganda! Enough of the moral infantilization of the public! Europeans are perfectly capable of understanding that security dilemmas are real, that NATO actions have consequences, and that peace is not achieved by pretending that Russia’s security concerns do not exist.

European security is indivisible. This principle means that no country can strengthen its security at the expense of another without provoking instability. It also means that diplomacy is not appeasement and historical honesty is not betrayal.

Germany once understood this. Ostpolitik was not a weakness, but strategic maturity. It was recognised that Europe’s stability depends on dialogue, arms control, economic relations and respect for Russia’s legitimate security interests.

Germany needs that maturity again today. It must no longer talk as if war was inevitable or even virtuous. Strategic thinking must no longer be reduced to alliance slogans. It must finally strive for real diplomacy – not as a PR measure, but as a serious attempt to rebuild a European security architecture that includes Russia rather than excludes it.

A renewed European security architecture must begin with clarity and restraint. First of all, it requires an unequivocal end to NATO’s eastward expansion – to include Ukraine, Georgia and every other state along Russia’s borders.

NATO enlargement was not an inevitable consequence of the post-war order; it was a political decision taken in violation of solemn assurances of 1990 and pursued despite repeated warnings of European destabilization.

Security in Ukraine will not be achieved by deploying German, French or other European troops, as this would only deepen the division and prolong the war. Stability is achieved through neutrality, backed by credible international guarantees. The story is clear: neither the Soviet Union nor the Russian Federation violated the sovereignty of neutral states in the post-war order – neither Finland, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, nor others. Neutrality worked because it addressed legitimate security concerns on all sides. There is no good reason to assume that it cannot work again.

Second, stability requires demilitarization and reciprocity. Russian forces must be kept away from NATO borders, and NATO forces –including missile systems– must be kept away from Russian borders. Security is indivisible, not one-sided. Border regions should be demilitarized through verifiable agreements and not overloaded with more and more weapons.

Sanctions should be lifted as part of a negotiated settlement; they have not brought peace and have caused serious damage to the European economy.

Germany, in particular, should reject the frivolous confiscation of Russian state assets – a blatant violation of international law that undermines confidence in the global financial system. The revival of German industry through lawful, treaty-based trade with Russia is not a capitulation, but economic realism. Europe should not destroy its own production base in the name of moral rhetoric.

Finally, Europe must return to the institutional foundations of its own security. The OSCE – not NATO– should once again serve as a central forum for European security, confidence-building and arms control. Strategic autonomy for Europe means precisely this: a European security order shaped by European interests, not by permanent subordination to NATO’s expansionist ideas.

France could expand its nuclear deterrent as a European security umbrella, but only in a purely defensive stance, without forward systems threatening Russia.

Europe should urgently press for a return to the INF framework and for comprehensive strategic nuclear arms control negotiations involving the United States and Russia –and later China–. The analogy between Kosovo and Ukraine must also be honestly acknowledged: borders have already been shifted in Europe with Western support. Borders are being shifted. The pursuit of peace must be inviolable.

And most importantly, learn history, Chancellor! And be honest about it! Without honesty there can be no trust. Without trust, there can be no security. And without diplomacy, Europe risks repeating the disasters from which it claims to have learned.

History will judge what Germany remembers – and forgets. This time let Germany choose diplomacy and peace and stand by its word.

Sincerely,

Jeffrey D. Sachs

University Professor

Columbia University